Analysis: Taliban’s power more centralised and localised
The Taliban’s governance has undergone few changes since 2021. Ministers remain in interim positions; no new constitution is presented and what was announced as temporary restriction on girls’ higher education remain in place. Still, power has become both more centralised and localised.
By Arne Strand, Senior Researcher, Chr Michelsen Institute
The present Taliban administration constitutes a theocracy unlike in any other Muslim country. Emir Haibatullah and his Kandahar-based secretariat have consolidated power and influence. Limited decision-making is delegated to the ministers and the cabinet that runs and manages Afghanistan’s daily affairs.
However, controlling Kabul and Kandahar is not sufficient to govern a diverse and conflict-fragmented country as Afghanistan and maintain unity in what was a highly decentralised Taliban movement. Afghan kings, presidents and emirs have all struggled to balance the centralisation of power and for allowing for a degree of local influence and decision-making to maintain a degree of popular support, or at least avoid armed opposition.
A recent research project looked at this dilemma and what means the Emir and his advisers apply to remain in control, while also trying to build local confidence in their administration. The Emir’s main attention is not with the rest of the world, it is centered on Afghanistan, local governance and the continuation of the Islamic Emirate.
Governing by decrees
Many decisions and appointments are done through the Emir’s decrees, published on the Emirate’s webpage. Decisions are enforced by the Emir using his religious authority and eagerness of the Ministry of Vice and Virtue to implement his decrees and the new “morality law”. Those disagreeing with decisions are instructed to not voice their opinion in public but convey it in private. Still critical voiced exists on i.e. girls’ higher education, and on the Emir and Pashtuns’ monopoly over power.
While a few changes have been made to the Kabul-based interim ministers, the large majority Pashtuns, the Emir has prioritised to consolidate his control over the provinces.
Provincial governors
The Emir appoints all provincial governors, whom he frequently rotates between provinces or into other key positions. The majority, again Pashtuns, combine a military and religious background and some have maintained military forces. They have all proven their loyalty to the Emir and report to him, though still the rotation system is to avoid corruption and nepotism and ensure they don’t build separate powerbases. They are in effect his extended arms thoughout Afghanistan.
Provincial Ulema Councils
The Provincial Ulema Council (PUC) is a new entity introduced in 2022, ensuring religious scholars a more dominant role in local governance. The Emir appoints PUC members, and they report directly to him. Among the PUC’s stated aims is to strengthen relations between the population and the Taliban authorities; engage in conflict resolution; monitor provincial governors and administration and ensure they govern according to Islamic Law.
One interesting finding is that not all PUC members are religious scholars or Taliban supporters, some are more traditional leaders holding trust within the population. Rather than maintaining a Pashtun and Sunni Muslim dominance does the PUCs represent the ethnic and religious composition of each province. A review of conflict-resolution decisions in mixed neighbourhoods, as the Shia dominant Bamiyan province, shows preference for solutions acceptable to both Sunni and Shia communities.
Many communities and even NGOs speak of the PUCs as their entry points to the Taliban government, referred to as a “bridge”. Being a PUC member is not regarded as an easy task though; many traditional leaders are reluctant to join as to not forfeit their trusted community position.
Village governance
The Emir not only discontinued the Afghan Parliament, but a later order also disbanded the elected Community Development Councils (CDCs). These village councils should have a mixed gender representation, tasked to select and implement projects under the National Solidarity Programme and be the contact point for NGOs.
The Taliban’s preferred village contacts are rather the traditional male village representatives (Arbabs or Maliks), or the larger village council. These represent a more traditional governance culture and depend on community acceptance to perform their tasks. In several provinces such councils actively engage with NGOs and the Taliban to ensure assistance to their villages.
This can indicate Taliban’s acceptance of more traditional Afghan governance and (male) leadership, possibly in the hope that their local influence might benefit back on the Taliban.
Taliban version I and II
When comparing this version of Taliban governance with the period 1994 – 2001 there are many similarities, but also some important differences. In both periods have Emirs ruled from Kandahar, but Emir Haibatullah has disbanded a previous governing council and consults only a limited number of (religiously conservative) advisers. During the first period Taliban presented themselves as only a temporary government, this time they plan to stay on.
The PUCs ensure a more representative and potentially influential body in each province, but moreover form part the Emir’s personal reporting and control system. The opportunities NGOs and communities had during the first period to operate girls’ schools and employ women might now be curtailed, even if there is strong local support and demands. PCUs might neither be willing to risk their positions to advocate with the Emir for changes in gender restrictive policies.
Increased and broader local representation might allow a degree of influence on the Taliban but does not yet imply any reversal of restrictive policies.